Political Trust Tracker
UK Trust in Politics Tracker
Trust in UK political institutions has collapsed since 2019. Only 18% of adults trust politicians, 24% trust the government, and 29% trust Parliament. This tracker charts how trust has fallen — and who trusts least.
Trust Trend 2019–2026
% of UK adults saying they “tend to trust” each institution. Sources: Ipsos Veracity Index, OECD Government at a Glance 2023/2024, Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement.
Institutional Trust by Voting Intention (2024–2026)
% who say they trust each institution “a great deal” or “a fair amount” by current party identification. Source: Ipsos / More in Common 2024–2025.
| Institution | Reform | Con | Labour | Lib Dem | Green | All adults |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Politicians generally | 7% | 14% | 26% | 24% | 31% | 18% |
| The government | 8% | 16% | 42% | 38% | 35% | 24% |
| Parliament (House of Commons) | 12% | 22% | 41% | 39% | 44% | 29% |
| Civil service | 21% | 31% | 46% | 52% | 48% | 38% |
| NHS | 49% | 54% | 74% | 72% | 71% | 63% |
| The judiciary / courts | 29% | 44% | 51% | 61% | 58% | 47% |
Reform voters are the least trusting of every political institution. Green voters are the most trusting of Parliament, the judiciary, and the civil service.
Trust in Politicians: By Age Group
Younger voters (18–34) show slightly higher trust in politicians than middle-age groups — though this partly reflects higher Green and Labour identification. Source: Ipsos 2024.
What Drove the Trust Collapse?
The Hansard Society’s Audit of Political Engagement tracks trust over two decades. The most dramatic falls occurred in three periods: the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal, the 2016–2019 Brexit deadlock, and the 2020–2022 Partygate crisis under Boris Johnson. Each event removed trust that had only partially recovered before the next blow landed.
The OECD’s 2023 Government at a Glance survey placed the UK among the bottom third of developed nations for trust in national government, behind France, Germany, Canada, and all Nordic countries. By contrast, trust in local government in the UK remains somewhat higher at around 48%.
The Starmer government’s own polling has not recovered institutional trust. By early 2026, trust in the government under Labour stood at 24% — broadly the same as the final months of the Conservative government. This suggests trust is now structural — driven by economic pessimism and media environment — rather than primarily partisan.
Trust in Politics: The Broader Implications
The collapse in trust in political institutions to historically low levels has direct and measurable consequences for UK democracy and party politics. At 18% trust in politicians, the UK is now at a level not seen since the aftermath of the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal. But unlike that crisis, which was associated with a specific event that voters blamed on specific individuals, the current collapse in trust is diffuse and systemic — driven by a combination of economic stagnation, perceived broken promises on immigration, NHS waiting lists, and a sense that mainstream politics is failing to address the concerns of ordinary people.
The rise of Reform UK to 28% in voting intention polling is directly connected to the trust crisis. Reform UK voters score dramatically lower on trust in every political institution than supporters of any other party — only 7% of Reform UK voters trust politicians generally, compared to 18% nationally. This profound institutional distrust is what makes Reform UK support sticky and difficult to dislodge: voters who do not trust the political system at all are unlikely to be persuaded back by the same politicians they have already rejected.
Keir Starmer's government entered office with a genuine opportunity to start rebuilding institutional trust after the chaos of the Johnson and Sunak years. However, the government's net approval of −44 and the continued fall in trust suggest that the new administration has not yet made progress on this front. The government satisfaction ratings show that the public evaluate Labour's performance in office very similarly to the late Conservative governments — a damning indication that the trust deficit is structural rather than purely partisan.
The political consequences of low trust are far-reaching. The Green Party's surge to 15% and Reform UK's rise to 28% both reflect a rejection of the established political parties. The age-based polling analysis shows that this rejection is strongest among the youngest (who move to the Greens) and oldest (who move to Reform UK) voters — a pincer movement that leaves Labour and the Conservatives fighting for a diminishing centre. Unless trust in mainstream politics begins to recover ahead of the 2029 General Election, the established two-party system faces continued fragmentation.
Research from the Hansard Society, which has tracked political engagement in the UK for over two decades, consistently shows that low trust correlates with lower voter turnout, more volatile voting behaviour, and greater susceptibility to populist appeals. The 2024 General Election saw turnout fall to 60% — the second-lowest in postwar history. If trust continues to fall, 2029 could see even lower engagement — potentially benefiting parties like Reform UK whose core voters are intensely motivated even if the broader electorate disengages.
Video: The Politics of Distrust
Video: How the collapse in trust in politicians connects to the dramatic shift in UK voting intention since 2024 — Reform UK's rise and Labour's fall as symptoms of a systemic trust crisis.