UK–EU Relations Polling 2026
53% say Brexit was wrong. 54% back the UK–EU reset. But only 38% want to rejoin. What does Britain actually want from its relationship with Europe?
Brexit Verdict: How Opinion Has Shifted
REGRET MAJORITY HOLDS| Year | Was Brexit right? | Was Brexit wrong? | Rejoin EU support | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun 2016 | 52% | 48% | — | Referendum result |
| Jan 2020 | 51% | 49% | ~34% | UK leaves EU; initial adjustment |
| Jan 2022 | 47% | 53% | 36% | First clear wrong majority; post-supply chain disruption |
| Jan 2024 | 46% | 54% | 37% | Rishi Sunak era; Windsor Framework agreed |
| Jan 2025 | 46% | 54% | 37% | Labour reset process beginning |
| May 2026 | 47% | 53% | 38% | UK–EU reset package agreed; modest regret easing |
The gap between “Brexit was wrong” (53%) and “want to rejoin” (38%) reflects a significant bloc of voters who acknowledge regret but do not want to re-run the process. This could be called the “reluctant Brexiteers” — people who voted Leave, now have doubts, but are not enthusiastic Remainers. They are the key audience for both the pro-EU parties (Lib Dems, Greens, SNP) and for Labour’s reset strategy.
The UK–EU Reset: What Does the Public Support?
MAJORITY SUPPORTThe UK–EU reset negotiated from 2024–2026 involves a package of closer cooperation measures short of full EU membership. The headline deal includes a UK–EU defence and security pact, improved Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) food safety arrangements reducing trade friction, a youth mobility scheme, and a fisheries access extension. Overall support for the reset package is 54%, but support for individual components varies significantly.
| Policy | Support | Oppose | Don’t know |
|---|---|---|---|
| UK-EU defence and security pact | 67% | 14% | 19% |
| Improved SPS food safety arrangements (less trade friction) | 63% | 12% | 25% |
| Youth mobility scheme (under-30s live/work in EU) | 52% | 31% | 17% |
| Fisheries access extension | 38% | 34% | 28% |
| UK-EU reset overall package | 54% | 26% | 20% |
| Would go further — wants full EU single market access | 44% | 38% | 18% |
| Wants to rejoin EU fully | 38% | 46% | 16% |
Defence & Security Pact (67% Support)
The defence pact is the most popular element of the reset, reflecting post-Ukraine war shifts in public opinion toward European security cooperation. Support crosses party lines: 71% of Labour voters, 68% of Conservatives, and even 44% of Reform UK voters back defence cooperation with the EU.
Youth Mobility (52% Support, Divided)
The youth mobility scheme is the most politically contested element. 52% overall support it, but opposition is concentrated among older voters (64% of over-65s oppose) and Reform UK voters (79% oppose). Among 18–34s, support reaches 81%, reflecting the generation that lost freedom of movement in 2021.
Party Trust on UK–EU Relations
The Liberal Democrats lead on EU-relations trust at 22% — reflecting their unambiguously pro-EU stance and explicit policy of seeking single market and customs union re-entry. Labour, despite conducting the reset negotiations, trails at 18%. The gap between conducting policy and being trusted on it reflects a broader Labour credibility problem: the party has not explicitly backed EU membership, which alienates both committed Remainers (who want more) and committed Leavers (who want less).
| Party | Trust on EU Relations | Change since 2024 | Policy position |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal Democrats | 22% | +4pts | Single market + customs union re-entry; long-term rejoin goal |
| Labour | 18% | −3pts | Reset without rejoining; “make Brexit work” framing |
| Greens | 14% | +3pts | Explicit rejoin policy; youth mobility; EU climate standards |
| SNP | 12% | +1pt | Scotland in EU via independence; pro-reset in interim |
| Conservatives | 9% | −6pts | Defend existing Brexit; oppose significant further concessions |
| Reform UK | 3% | +1pt | Hard Brexit; oppose reset; favour Commonwealth trade priority |
| None / Don’t know | 22% | +1pt | — |
The Age Gap: Britain’s Most Divided Issue
SHARPEST GENERATIONAL DIVIDE IN POLITICS| Age Group | Say Brexit was wrong | Support youth mobility | Would vote to rejoin EU |
|---|---|---|---|
| 18–24 | 83% | 71% | 65% |
| 25–34 | 77% | 57% | 58% |
| 35–44 | 60% | 44% | 45% |
| 45–54 | 52% | 38% | 41% |
| 55–64 | 46% | 32% | 36% |
| 65+ | 39% | 24% | 31% |
This generational divide means that long-run demographic change should, all else equal, increase pro-EU polling figures over time as younger generations become a larger share of the electorate. However, analysts caution that voter preferences on EU membership tend to stabilise with age, making a simple linear projection unreliable.
By Party: Where Voters Stand on EU Relations
| Party Supporters | Brexit verdict | Reset stance | Rejoin EU |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reform UK voters | 79% say Brexit right | 71% oppose reset | 4% want to rejoin |
| Conservative voters | 66% say Brexit right | 44% oppose reset | 11% want to rejoin |
| Labour voters | 58% say Brexit wrong | 62% support reset | 42% want to rejoin |
| Lib Dem voters | 88% say Brexit wrong | 86% support reset | 74% want to rejoin |
| Green voters | 89% say Brexit wrong | 91% support reset | 79% want to rejoin |
| SNP voters | 84% say Brexit wrong | 88% support reset | 81% want to rejoin |
The sharpest divide is between Reform UK and Lib Dem voters — the two parties whose voter bases have the most opposing views on EU membership. This reflects the broader polarisation of UK politics on this issue, with the centre of gravity (Labour voters) roughly split between wishing Brexit had not happened and accepting the current settlement.
UK–EU Issues: What Voters Care About Most
| Issue | % Say Important | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Trade barriers and border friction | 58% | Economic concern; affects businesses and food prices |
| Freedom of movement loss | 52% | Particularly salient for under-45s; youth mobility debate |
| Fishing rights | 42% | Symbolic issue; disproportionate political weight vs. economic size |
| EU defence cooperation (Ukraine context) | 61% | Ukraine war has made EU security partnership more attractive |
| Regulatory alignment (product standards) | 38% | Complex; public awareness low but economic impact high |
| Northern Ireland Protocol / Windsor Framework | 44% | Cross-community NI concern; political hot potato |
| EU student exchange (Erasmus/Turing) | 46% | Strong feeling among graduates and families with young people |
| UK financial services EU access | 29% | Technical; primarily City concern |
Frequently Asked Questions
Do most UK voters want to rejoin the EU in 2026?
No. While 53% say Brexit was wrong, only 38% say they would vote to rejoin the EU in a referendum. The gap reflects a significant cohort of “reluctant Brexiteers” — voters who acknowledge regret but do not want to re-run the 2016 vote. The more common position is wanting closer UK–EU ties without full membership, which is the basis of the reset approach backed by 54% of voters.
What is the UK–EU reset and does the public support it?
The UK–EU reset refers to a package of closer cooperation agreed in 2025–2026: a UK–EU defence and security pact (67% support), improved SPS food arrangements (63% support), a youth mobility scheme (52% support), and extended fisheries arrangements (38% support). Overall, 54% back the package. Opposition is concentrated among Reform UK supporters (71% against) and older voters in Leave-voting areas.
How do different age groups view UK–EU relations?
Young voters overwhelmingly want closer EU ties: 77% of 18–34s say Brexit was wrong, 81% back youth mobility, and 61% would vote to rejoin. Among over-65s, only 39% say Brexit was wrong and 31% would vote to rejoin — a difference of 38 percentage points on the rejoin question alone, making EU relations the sharpest generational divide in UK politics.
Which party do voters trust most on UK–EU relations?
The Liberal Democrats lead on EU-relations trust at 22%, reflecting their explicitly pro-EU stance. Labour, despite conducting the reset negotiations, trails at 18% — partly because its “make Brexit work” framing satisfies neither committed Remainers (who want more) nor committed Leavers (who want less). The Greens at 14% appeal to younger pro-EU voters. Reform UK is trusted by 3% on this issue.
What do UK voters think about freedom of movement and youth mobility?
52% of UK adults cite the loss of EU freedom of movement as an important consequence of Brexit, making it the second most-cited EU-related concern after trade barriers. Among 18–34 year olds, 71% back a youth mobility scheme and 81% say they should have the right to live and work in the EU. Among over-65s, only 24% support youth mobility — a 57-point gap that represents the sharpest generational divide on any specific policy element of the Brexit debate. The Turing Scheme, the government’s Erasmus replacement for student exchanges, is rated inadequate by 62% of those who are aware of it. 46% overall cite EU student exchange rights as an important issue.
How has Brexit affected UK trade and what do voters want now?
58% of UK adults cite trade barriers and border friction as the most important EU-relations issue — significantly higher than any other specific consequence. 63% support improved SPS (food safety and agricultural standards) arrangements that would reduce trade friction on food exports and imports. 52% say Brexit has made them personally worse off economically, compared to 22% who say better off and 26% who see no difference. The EU remains the UK’s largest trading partner by value, accounting for around 42% of UK exports. Only 44% support full single market access, reflecting ambivalence about the regulatory constraints this would require, while 38% want to rejoin fully.
Explore More
Brexit Legacy
38% say Brexit was worth it, 45% say it was not. The polling shift since the 2016 referendum and what it means for the parties.
Young Voters
The generation that lost EU freedom of movement in 2021. 77% of 18–34s say Brexit was wrong — the starkest generational divide in British politics.
Liberal Democrats
The most explicitly pro-EU party in Westminster at 13% nationally. Leading on EU-relations trust at 22%. Their path to power runs through the blue wall.
Reform UK
The most anti-reset party. 71% of Reform UK supporters oppose the UK–EU reset package. Farage has called any EU concessions a betrayal of the Brexit vote.
Northern Ireland & Windsor Framework
The Windsor Framework gives NI a unique dual-market status. The DUP accepted it in 2024 — but internal tensions remain and it continues to shape NI politics.
Electoral Reform & PR
Under PR, the 2024 election result would have looked very different. 71% of Reform UK supporters back PR — the party whose voters are most under-represented under FPTP.