International Comparison

European Populism Wave: Where Does Reform UK Fit?

The rise of right-wing populist parties across Western Europe is the defining political story of the 2020s. From France to Austria, from Italy to the Netherlands, parties that were once confined to the fringes of European politics now sit in governments, lead in national polls, or operate as the dominant opposition force. Reform UK at 28% in British polling is part of this wider phenomenon — but it sits within a specific national context that makes the UK case distinct in important ways.

This page examines the European populist wave country by country, compares each movement to Reform UK, and addresses the question that animates much of the British political debate: is Brexit already a form of UK exceptionalism that changes what further populist success here would mean?

France: Rassemblement National (RN) — 33%

France has the most electorally advanced right-wing populist party in Western Europe. The Rassemblement National, formerly Front National, has been transformed from a fringe party associated with Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Holocaust revisionism into a mainstream electoral force under his daughter Marine Le Pen and her successor Jordan Bardella as party president.

RN currently polls at approximately 33% in French national polling — the highest figure for any right-wing populist party in a major Western European country. This support base is drawn from across French society: former Socialist voters in post-industrial northern France, former centrist voters in southern France, and younger working-class voters across the country. The 2022 and 2024 legislative elections saw RN become the largest party in terms of first-round vote share, though the two-round “republican front” system prevented it from winning a majority.

RN vs Reform UK

RN at 33% is 5 points ahead of Reform UK at 28%, but this gap matters less than the systemic difference. France’s two-round system suppresses RN representation in parliament despite its first-round strength: opposition parties stand aside for each other in second rounds to block RN. The UK’s FPTP system suppresses Reform UK representation through a different mechanism: vote splitting and geographic concentration. Both systems frustrate translation of vote share into seats, but by different routes.

The substantive policy agendas are broadly similar: immigration restriction, economic nationalism, opposition to net zero as currently structured, scepticism of EU integration (though RN has softened its Frexit position). The key difference is that RN operates within the EU, while Reform UK operates in a post-Brexit UK that has already enacted its central Eurosceptic demand.

Germany: AfD — 20%

The Alternative für Deutschland is the most controversial of Europe’s right-wing populist parties. Founded in 2013 as a Eurosceptic party, AfD has moved progressively to the right and is now classified by Germany’s domestic intelligence agency as a “confirmed extremist organisation” in parts of the country, following documented links between some party members and neo-Nazi networks.

AfD polls at approximately 20% nationally, but this figure masks a significant geographic divide. In the former East German states — Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern — AfD polls at 25–35%, reflecting distinctive post-reunification economic grievances, weaker civil society traditions, and a specific generational experience of the GDR. In West German states, AfD is typically 12–16%.

The “cordon sanitaire” policy of all other major German parties refusing to cooperate with AfD means that despite its 20% national polling, AfD exercises almost no direct legislative influence. The CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, and FDP have consistently ruled out any coalition with AfD at federal level.

AfD vs Reform UK

The comparison between AfD and Reform UK is frequently made in British media but requires significant qualification. AfD’s radical wing is considerably more extreme than anything in Reform UK’s mainstream. Farage has explicitly distanced Reform UK from ethno-nationalist politics in a way that AfD has not consistently done. The eastern Germany concentration of AfD support has no direct Reform UK equivalent. And AfD operates under proportional representation, meaning its 20% consistently produces Bundestag seats; Reform UK at 28% holds 5 seats in Westminster.

The more accurate comparison is the policy surface: both parties stress immigration reduction, oppose net zero commitments, position themselves as voices for left-behind communities ignored by metropolitan elites, and combine right-wing economics on some issues with left-wing economics on others (Reform UK’s NHS protection commitments; AfD’s social spending commitments to eastern Germany).

Italy: Fratelli d’Italia — 29% (In Government)

Italy under Giorgia Meloni is the most significant example of what happens when a right-wing populist party actually wins power in a major European economy. Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) rose from 4% in 2018 to become Italy’s largest party in the 2022 elections, and Meloni became Prime Minister. FdI currently polls at approximately 29% — suggesting that governing has not significantly eroded its support.

Meloni’s government has pursued a notably more pragmatic course than her pre-election rhetoric suggested. On EU relations, Italy under Meloni has remained within the EU mainstream more than anticipated. On immigration, the government has sought EU-level agreements rather than unilateral action. On the economy, the constraints of bond market expectations and EU fiscal rules have limited radical departures from predecessor policies.

FdI vs Reform UK: The Governance Test

Meloni’s experience is the most relevant test case for what Reform UK in government might look like. The Italian experience suggests that populist parties in power face structural constraints that moderate their most radical positions, particularly on economics and EU relations. For Reform UK, the relevant question is whether a future Reform UK government would pursue the immigration and net zero positions in its manifesto with the same vigour as in opposition. Italy suggests the answer is: considerably less so.

Netherlands: PVV — 23% (In Government)

Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) entered the Dutch coalition government in 2024 after PVV won the most seats in the November 2023 elections with 37 seats out of 150. PVV currently polls at approximately 23% nationally. The party is the most explicitly anti-Islamic of Europe’s right-wing populist parties, which distinguishes it from both Reform UK and most other comparable movements.

The Dutch proportional system meant that PVV’s November 2023 result translated directly into parliamentary seats. A PVV-led coalition was eventually formed with the VVD (liberal-conservative), NSC (centrist), and BBB (agrarian populist) parties. This coalition has struggled with internal tensions and has already faced confidence votes. The Dutch experience illustrates that entering government does not automatically produce stable or effective governance for populist parties, particularly when their core policy commitments conflict with coalition partners.

Netherlands vs UK: The FPTP Test

The Netherlands uses pure proportional representation with a very low threshold (0.67% to win a seat). This means any party polling at 23% wins 23% of seats. Reform UK at 28% under a Dutch-style system would hold approximately 182 of 650 Westminster seats — making it the largest party in a hung parliament. Under UK FPTP, it holds 5.

Austria: FPÖ — 29% (In Government)

Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) won the most votes in the September 2024 national elections with approximately 29% — the first time in its history it finished first. After months of coalition negotiations, FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl became Chancellor in January 2025, leading a coalition with the ÖVP (Christian democrats).

FPÖ’s platform combines hard-line immigration restriction, opposition to EU sanctions on Russia, scepticism of climate policy, and Austrian cultural nationalism. Kickl has been explicitly friendly to the Kremlin, which distinguishes FPÖ sharply from Reform UK (which takes a harder line on Russia).

FPÖ’s entry into government is the closest current European parallel to what a Reform UK government might look like — a right-wing populist party in coalition, constrained by its partner and by institutional realities, pursuing elements of its platform while moderating others.

UK Exceptionalism: Brexit Already Done

The most important structural fact about Reform UK’s position in the European populist landscape is that the UK has already done the thing that most European right-wing populist parties are still demanding: left the European Union. This matters in several ways.

First, it removes the central organising demand that gave UKIP and early Brexit Party their energy. Reform UK must organise around different grievances. This arguably makes its support base more diffuse — people who voted for Brexit but are now concerned about immigration, net zero, or NHS decline may not have the same visceral intensity of commitment as those who felt the EU question was existential.

Second, it means Reform UK cannot credibly promise to “take back control” in the way its predecessors did. Whatever problems voters perceive with immigration or the economy, they cannot be blamed on EU membership. This creates a more complicated political identity for the party.

Third, it means that if Reform UK ever enters government, it will be governing a post-Brexit UK that has already experienced the consequences of the policy its predecessors advocated. The honeymoon period that Brexit produced has largely passed; the economic costs are visible alongside any claimed benefits.

The Five-Country Summary

The Structural Constraint: FPTP Suppresses Populist Representation

The single most important difference between Reform UK’s position and that of its European counterparts is the electoral system. Under proportional representation, every European right-wing populist party polling at 20–33% holds a proportionate share of parliamentary seats. FPÖ at 29% in Austria holds 29% of the National Council. AfD at 20% holds 20% of the Bundestag. PVV at 23% holds 37 out of 150 Dutch parliament seats.

Reform UK at 28% holds 5 of 650 Westminster seats: 0.77%. This is the most extreme example of FPTP vote-to-seat distortion in modern British electoral history. The practical consequence is that Reform UK’s 28% polling, while historically remarkable, translates into almost no current legislative power — unlike its European counterparts, which have entered government or hold large parliamentary blocs.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why does 28% for Reform UK produce so few seats while 20% for AfD produces many?

Electoral systems. Germany uses Mixed-Member Proportional representation: half the Bundestag seats are elected in single-member constituencies, the other half from party lists, with the list seats distributed to ensure overall proportionality. The result is that a party with 20% nationally gets approximately 20% of seats. The UK’s first-past-the-post system has no proportional correction mechanism. The party with the most votes in each constituency wins that constituency; national vote totals are irrelevant. Reform UK’s 28% is distributed across thousands of constituencies where it typically comes second or third, winning almost nothing.

Could a cordon sanitaire emerge around Reform UK in the UK?

A cordon sanitaire — an agreement by all other parties never to cooperate with or form a coalition with a specified party — currently exists in Germany around AfD and has existed in Belgium around Vlaams Belang for decades. The UK’s electoral system makes the formal mechanism less relevant: because governments are formed by the party that wins a majority of constituencies, informal coalition negotiations are rarer. However, an informal cordon sanitaire dynamic already operates in the UK: Labour and the Liberal Democrats will not form any arrangement with Reform UK, and the Conservatives have repeatedly ruled it out under Badenoch, though this position may come under pressure if Reform UK’s polling holds into the 2029 campaign.

What is the Brexit exceptionalism argument?

The Brexit exceptionalism argument holds that the UK will not follow the continental pattern of right-wing populist parties entering government because the UK populist right already achieved its primary goal in 2016–2020. Having delivered Brexit, the argument goes, Farage and Reform UK lack the single mobilising demand that drives populist surges to their highest levels. Against this, critics note that post-Brexit Britain still has very high immigration, a dysfunctional NHS, and severe housing costs — all of which provide plausible alternative grievance frames. Reform UK’s 2026 local election results suggest the Brexit exceptionalism argument has not suppressed its vote.

Which European country’s experience is most relevant to the UK?

France is arguably the most structurally relevant comparison. Like the UK, France uses a non-proportional electoral system (two-round majority) that suppresses right-wing populist representation relative to vote share. Like the UK, France has seen its populist right party move from far-right fringe to mainstream electoral contender over two decades. The RN under Le Pen father was unambiguously far-right; the RN under Le Pen daughter and Bardella has successfully detoxified the brand enough to win a third of French voters. Reform UK has undertaken a comparable but more compressed journey from UKIP through the Brexit Party to its current form.

How does the EU Parliament factor in?

The European Parliament elections of June 2024 provided the most recent Europe-wide snapshot of right-wing populist vote share. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) — the two main EP groups that right-wing populist parties belong to — made combined gains, though the centre-right EPP retained the largest group. Reform UK does not sit in the European Parliament (the UK is no longer an EU member), which is itself a marker of the UK’s distinctive position. UKIP and the Brexit Party were both large presences in EU Parliament delegations; Reform UK has no EU Parliament equivalent and therefore misses the platform that EP elections provide for right-wing populist parties in member states to demonstrate their cross-border solidarity and electoral strength.

Is the populist surge a permanent realignment or a protest vote?

This is the central question for European politics in the late 2020s. The Italian and Dutch examples suggest that once right-wing populist parties reach government, their support does not collapse immediately — FdI and PVV have both maintained polling levels roughly comparable to their election-winning figures. However, Austria’s FPÖ and France’s RN have both experienced periods of significant polling decline after being close to or in power, recovering to new highs in subsequent cycles. The UK evidence from UKIP and the Brexit Party, which both largely collapsed after their electoral peaks, might suggest a protest-vote interpretation for Reform UK. But the post-Brexit context is different: there is no single achievement that would remove Reform UK’s reason for existence the way the 2016 referendum partially did for UKIP.

For readers interested in the deeper academic literature on European populism, the work of Cas Mudde and Chantal Mouffe provides contrasting frameworks: Mudde from a party-systems perspective, Mouffe from a democratic theory perspective. Both help explain why the populist surge is structural rather than incidental to contemporary Western European politics.

Further Reading